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Purpose and Background 
This white paper summarizes NASA research results that have informed Special Committee 228 (SC-228) 
discussions and decisions regarding the inclusion of a warning-level alert within the detect and avoid 
(DAA) alerting structure for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).  
For UAS, the removal of the pilot from onboard the aircraft has eliminated the ability of the ground -
based pilot in command (PIC) to use out-the-window visual information to make judgments about a 
potential threat of a loss of well clear with another aircraft. As a result, the DAA traffic display will be the 
primary source of information that the PIC can use to execute the three primary well clear functions: 1) 
detect a potential loss of well clear, 2) determine a resolution maneuver, and 3) upload that maneuver 
to the aircraft via the ground control station (GCS). In addition, pilots are required to coordinate with air 
traffic control (ATC) prior to maneuvering off of their approved flight plan.  In determining an 
appropriate resolution maneuver to avoid a loss of well clear, the PIC must decide both when and how 
to maneuver, and both the timeliness and the accuracy (i.e., correctness) of the maneuver are critical to 
reducing the likelihood and/or severity of a loss of well clear. 
Alerting information is one of three critical components of the DAA display, along with traffic 
information elements (e.g., relative heading, speed and altitude) and maneuver guidance. Alerting 
information and maneuver guidance, in particular, have been found to have a significant impact, both 
statistically and practically, on pilots’  ability to avoid and minimize the severity of losses of well clear. 
While all three display components are key to pilots performing the traffic avoidance task of remaining 
well clear, in general, alerting information provides crucial information about when a resolution 
maneuver is required while maneuver guidance assists the pilot in determining how best to maneuver.  
A fundamental task of the DAA alerting system is to provide critical timing information to the pilot about 
the potential for a loss of well clear with another aircraft. This is done by employing both temporal and 
spatial thresholds that indicate to the pilot the likelihood and imminence of a loss of well clear. The 
design of the DAA alerting thresholds is a balancing act between eliciting the desired pilot response in 
real loss of well clear threat events and reducing  excessive, unnecessary, and/or uncoordinated UAS 
maneuvering within the air traffic environment; larger thresholds, both spatially and temporally, may 
increase the likelihood of a pilot avoiding a loss of well clear, but it can also increase the frequency of 
maneuvering — especially in cases where a maneuver is not actually needed to maintain well clear. 
A series of human in the loop (HITL) simulations have been conducted as part of NASA’s Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. The purpose of these 
HITLs has been to provide empirical results in order to inform development of the minimum human-
machine interface requirements for the DAA system. This white paper will present those results which 
provide evidence of a human performance benefit (in terms of response times and ability to remain well 
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clear of other aircraft) of the DAA warning alert both with and without a collision avoidance system on 
board the aircraft.  
Empirical Support for Inclusion of Warning Alert in DAA Structure 
Alerting Structures 
In order to show the relative performance benefits of the DAA warning alert, two alert structures will be 
compared: the “PT5 Alert Structure” and the “iHITL Alert Structure”.  
PT5 Alert Structure 
The warning alert level was included as part of the alerting structure in a HITL simulation experiment for 
the first time during NASA’s “Part Task (PT) 5” activity (Rorie, Fern & Shively, 2016). The alert levels and 
thresholds used in this simulation are shown in Table 1. This alert structure was based on the 
acceptance of a modified well clear definition  recommended by the Sense and Avoid Science and 
Research Panel (SARP; Cook & Brooks, 2015; Walker, 2014).  
Table 1. Alert structure and thresholds utilized in NASA’s PT5 simulation experiment.  
Alert Level Separation Criteria 
Time to Loss of Well 
Clear 
Symbology 
Aural Alert 
Verbiage 
DAA Warning 
Alert 
modTau = 35 sec 
HMD = 0.75 nm 
DMOD = 0.75 nm 
ZTHR = 450 ft 
25 sec 
 
“Traffic, Maneuver 
Now” 
Corrective DAA 
Alert 
modTau = 35 sec 
HMD = 0.75 nm 
DMOD = 0.75 nm 
ZTHR = 450 ft 
75 sec 
 
“Traffic, Separate” 
Preventive DAA 
Alert 
modTau = 35 sec 
HMD = 1.0 nm 
DMOD = 0.75 nm 
ZTHR = 700 ft 
N/A 
 
“Traffic, Monitor” 
DAA Proximate 
Alert 
modTau = 35 sec 
HMD = 1.5 nm 
DMOD = 0.75 nm 
ZTHR = 1200 ft 
N/A 
 
N/A 
None (Target) 
Within surveillance 
field of regard 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Each alert level within the PT5 alerting structure was designed to indicate to the pilot the imminence of 
a potential loss of well clear (i.e., violation of the separation criteria), with another aircraft. The relative 
threat of a loss of well clear for each alert level is summarized below from lowest to highest threat level : 
 None: no predicted loss of well clear 
 DAA Proximate Alert: no predicted loss of well clear, however, a change in the horizontal or 
vertical trajectory of either aircraft could potentially result in a change in alert level 
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 Preventive DAA Alert: no predicted loss of well clear, however, a change in the horizontal or 
vertical trajectory of either aircraft could result in an immediate change in alert level 
 Corrective DAA Alert: predicted loss of well clear within 75 seconds or less 
 DAA Warning Alert: predicted loss of well clear within 25 seconds or less 
iHITL Alert Structure 
In the NASA DAA integrated HITL simulation (i.e., “iHITL”) prior to PT5 and the SC-228 acceptance of a 
well clear definition, the alert structure shown in Table 2 was used (Rorie & Fern, 2015). The alerting 
levels and thresholds in this alert structure was based on time to closest point of approach (CPA), and 
the collision avoidance alert level threshold was treated as equivalent to the well clear threshold (i.e., a 
collision avoidance alert would be triggered when well clear was lost).   
Table 2. Alert structure and thresholds utilized in NASA’s iHITL simulation experiment.  
Alert Level Separation Criteria 
Time to Loss of  
Well Clear* 
Symbology Aural Alert Verbiage 
Collision 
Avoidance 
HMD = 0.80 nm 
ZTHR = 400 ft 
0 sec 
 
“Climb/Descend” 
“Turn Right/Left” 
Predicted 
Collision 
Avoidance 
HMD = 0.80 nm 
ZTHR = 400 ft 
70 sec 
 
“Traffic, Traffic” 
Self-Separation 
HMD = 1.2 nm 
ZTHR = 900 ft 
N/A 
 
“Traffic, Traffic” 
Preventive 
HMD = 2.0 nm 
ZTHR = 900 ft 
N/A 
 
N/A 
Proximal 
Within surveillance 
field of regard 
N/A 
 
N/A 
*Converted from time to collision avoidance alert, which occurred at 40sec to CPA, to allow for an easier 
comparison to the thresholds used in PT5. 
 
Each alert level within the iHITL alert structure was designed to indicate to the pilot the relative threat 
(i.e., loss of self-separation* or collision avoidance event) of nearby aircraft, summarized below from 
lowest-to-highest threat level. 
 Proximal: not a current threat 
                                                                 
* The term “self-separation” was used frequently early in the development of the SC-228 MOPS as an alternate description 
of the pilot task to remain well clear (i.e., maintain self-separation). Due to concerns from ATC organizations regarding 
the use of “separation” as a function that falls outside the scope of ATC responsibilities, the term was officially removed 
from the draft MOPS after the internal review and comment in August 2015. The term has been replaced with “traffic 
avoidance”. 
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 Preventive: no predicted loss of well clear (i.e., collision avoidance event), however, a 
change in the horizontal or vertical trajectory of either aircraft could potentially result in 
a change in alert level  
 Self-Separation: no predicted loss of well clear, however, a change in the horizontal or 
vertical trajectory of either aircraft could result in an immediate change in alert level 
 Predicted Collision Avoidance: predicted loss of collision avoidance event - i.e., loss of 
well clear - in (approximately) 70 seconds or less 
 Collision Avoidance: well clear has been lost, now considered a collision avoidance event 
Alert Structure Comparison 
In order to more directly compare the different alert levels used in each simulation, Table 3 presents the 
alert levels according to whether there is a predicted loss of well clear, and if so, the time to loss of well 
clear.  
Table 3. Side-by-side comparison of the iHITL and PT5 alert structures. 
PT5 Alert Structure 
Predicted Loss of 
Well Clear 
Time to 
Predicted LoWC 
iHITL Alert Structure 
Symbol Level   Level Symbol 
 
None (Target) No N/A Proximal  
 
DAA Proximate 
Alert 
No N/A Preventive Alert  
 
Preventive DAA 
Alert 
No N/A 
Self-Separation 
Alert 
 
 
Corrective DAA 
Alert 
Yes < 75 sec* 
Predicted 
Collision 
Avoidance Alert 
 
 
DAA Warning 
Alert 
Yes < 25 sec N/A N/A 
N/A N/A Yes 0 sec 
Collision 
Avoidance Alert 
 
*Corrective DAA alert becomes a DAA Warning alert at 25 sec to loss of well clear 
 
Table 3 shows that the main difference between the two alert levels is the implementation of the two 
most severe alert levels in each structure. The highest two alert levels for each alert structure are 
depicted in Figure 1 along with their relationship to the well clear threshold. The difference between the 
highest, or warning, alert levels is examined first.  
In the PT5 alerting structure, the warning alert level occurs 25 seconds prior to a predicted loss of well 
clear whereas in the iHITL alerting structure, the warning level occurs at the occurrence of a loss of well 
clear. Both implementations of the warning-level alert meet the guidance laid out by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) for the use of caution (yellow) and warning (red) symbology on flight 
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decks and specified in Advisory Circular 24.1322-1 [Department of Transportation (DOT), 2010]. 
According to this regulatory document, a caution alert is defined as “the level or category of alert for 
conditions that require immediate flightcrew awareness and a less urgent subsequent flightcrew 
response than a warning alert,” and a warning alert as “the level or category of alert for conditions that 
require immediate flightcrew awareness and immediate flightcrew response.”  
 
Figure 1. The relationship between the iHITL and PT5 caution and warning alert levels, and the well clear 
threshold. 
In the PT5 alerting structure, the DAA warning alert indicates an imminent loss of well clear and the 
need for an immediate maneuver to avoid penetration of the well clear threshold. In the iHITL alerting 
structure, the warning alert indicates a loss of well clear and the need for an immediate maneuver to 
avoid a collision. While both of the alerts indicate a hazard situation and a need for an immediate 
maneuver, functionally they assist the pilot in accomplishing two different goals. The former provides a 
last indication to the pilot to avoid a loss of well clear, while the latter provides a last indication to the 
pilot to avoid a midair collision. Thus, as can be seen in Figure 1, the PT5 warning alert supports the DAA 
function of maintaining well clear while the iHITL warning supports a collision avoidance function, which 
is optional in the current phase of the DAA MOPS development. 
The two implementations of the warning alert also impact the alert immediately preceding it. While the 
PT5 corrective alert and the iHITL predicted collision avoidance alert provide the same essential 
information to the pilot (that there is a predicted loss of well clear and a maneuver is needed), the 
temporal information (i.e., the relative imminence of a loss of well clear) provided to the pilot for each 
alert is different. For the PT5 corrective alert, the predicted time to a loss of well clear is roughly 25 – 75 
seconds. At the 25 second threshold, the warning alert is triggered and alerts the pilot that there is less 
than 25 seconds to a loss of well clear. For the iHITL predicted collision avoidance alert, the predicted 
time to loss of well clear is anywhere from 0 – 75 seconds.  
As Figure 1 shows, the corrective and warning alerts in PT5 effectively replaced the predicted collision 
avoidance alert in iHITL (and the collision avoidance warning alert was removed). By doing this, the alert 
structure provided pilots with supplementary information regarding the time to a predicted loss of well 
clear. In comparison, the iHITL alerting structure contained more ambiguity regarding the amount of 
time pilots had to resolve an active threat. As will be shown in the next section, this difference in the 
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urgency and temporal information provided by the PT5 and iHITL alert structures has a significant 
impact on pilot response times and ability to maintain well clear. 
Pilot Performance Comparison 
Pilot Response Times 
Response Time 
Pilots’ response times (i.e., measured response) can be deconstructed in a variety of ways, each 
assessing a different aspect of the pilot’s response to a DAA alert. While higher-level metrics can give a 
sense of the pilot’s overall response to a DAA alert, there are finer-grained metrics that address a 
specific component or stage of a pilot’s reaction. The rest of this section will look at three different 
response time metrics in an attempt to clearly understand the impact of a DAA warning alert level on 
pilots performing the DAA task. The following results compare pilot responses to a predicted collision 
avoidance alert in iHITL, which indicated that the pilot had, at most, 75s before a loss of well clear, to 
pilot responses in PT5 to encounters that were a corrective DAA or DAA warning at first alert. Corrective 
at first alert indicated that pilots had at least 25s and, at most, 75s to a loss of well clear, while a warning 
at first alert indicated that pilots had no more than 25s to a loss of well clear. While the two simulations 
were evaluating substantially different displays, making direct comparison difficult, the trends between 
and within each experiment still provide insight into the performance effects of the iHITL and PT5 alert 
structures. 
Aircraft response time, calculated as the time from the onset of the relevant DAA alert to the pilot’s first 
upload to their aircraft, provides a broad look at pilot responses to a DAA alert. Namely, aircraft 
response time offers a global look at how quickly the pilot completed the major stages of the DAA task: 
detect a potential threat to well clear, determine an appropriate resolution maneuver, and execute that 
resolution maneuver. As shown in Figure 2, pilots in iHITL completed the task fairly quickly in response 
to a predicted collision avoidance alert, with aircraft response times ranging from 9.94s to 16.29s 
between display configurations. (Note: despite similar display labels between iHITL and PT5, e.g., “D1”, 
the display configurations differed between experiments.) Figure 2 also shows that pilot response times 
in PT5 depended substantially on the threat type at first alert. Pilot response times were at least twice 
as long for pilots completing the task when responding to corrective alerts, which ranged from 18.25s to 
27.01s, than when responding to warning alerts, which ranged from 7.71s to 10.43. While the aircraft 
response time data demonstrates that pilot responses to PT5 warning alerts were the quickest and most 
consistent overall, the metric is too coarse to offer insight into which aspect of the task – initiating a 
response or implementing a response – was responsible for these differences. 
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Figure 2. Mean aircraft response times for the predicted collision avoidance alert (iHITL, left) and the 
corrective and warning alerts (PT5, right). 
Initial response time is a measure of the time between the onset of an alert and the pilo t’s first explicit 
attempt to make a change (i.e., edit) to their aircraft. The metric provides an indication of the urgency of 
the pilot’s response and excludes any interaction time with the GCS command and control (C2) 
interfaces to actually input a response. As shown in Figure 3, pilots’ initial response times in iHITL were 
consistent across display configurations, ranging 6.64s to 8.52s. The pattern holds for pilot responses to 
warning alerts in PT5, though quicker overall, where initial response times ranged from 3.83s to 4.78s. 
Initial response times to corrective alerts in PT5, however, were slower and much more variable than 
seen with the other alerts. Here, initial response times ranged from 9.57s to 20.67s. This metric 
therefore explains at least part of the reduction seen in aircraft response time for warning alerts in PT5 
compared to both the iHITL predicted collision avoidance alert and the PT5 corrective alert: the 
presence of a dedicated warning alert minimizes the amount of time pilots spend waiting to initiate their 
response to a DAA alert.  
 
  
Figure 3. Mean initial response times for the predicted collision avoidance alert (iHITL, left) and the 
corrective and warning alerts (PT5, right). 
The initial response time data also demonstrates that an alert level that unambiguously informs pilots 
that there is sufficient time for other tasks (i.e., the corrective alert in PT5), such as coordinating with 
ATC, leads not just to slower performance but also more variable responses across display 
configurations. Pilots in the “D4” condition in PT5, for example, spent a large amount of time utilizing a 
tool that allowed them to test the threat level of proposed heading or altitude maneuvers prior to 
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interacting with the C2 interfaces. While this increased their initial response time considerably in 
response to corrective alerts, pilots clearly understood that they did not have the same amount of time 
to utilize the tool in responding to warning alerts. The absence of an additional alert level for pilots in 
iHITL appears to have had a flattening effect on pilots’ initial response times across display 
configurations. Comparing the initial response times in iHITL to those for corrective threats at first in 
alert in PT5, it appears that pilots in iHITL preferred to initiate maneuvers sooner rather than presume 
there was time for additional actions (such as coordination with ATC) regardless of display. However, 
their initial responses, on average, were not as urgent as those seen for the PT5 warning alert. 
The other major component of the global aircraft response time metric is initial edit time, which refers 
only to the amount of time a pilot spent interacting with the GCS in order to implement an ini tial change 
(e.g., upload a newly commanded heading or altitude) to the aircraft. An unavoidable artifact of this 
metric is the influence of both C2 interface design and DAA display configuration, which directly affect 
how a pilot interfaces with both components of the GCS. However, no changes were made to the GCS 
C2 interface between iHITL and PT5, therefore most of the difference in edit time can be attributed to 
differences in DAA display configurations.  As shown in Figure 4, display configuration had a pronounced 
effect on the variability of initial edit times in iHITL, which ranged from 2.20s to 8.79s. This result was 
not unexpected since the iHITL displays varied greatly in how assistive the conflict detection and 
resolution tools were (e.g., suggesting multiple resolution maneuver solutions vs. offering just a single 
one), as well as how tightly coupled they were to the C2 interfaces; both the D3 and D4 iHITL DAA 
display configurations had single resolution maneuver suggestions that were auto-loaded into the C2 
interface. PT5, by contrast, intentionally minimized the variability in GCS integration between the DAA 
display by utilizing suggestive guidance designs (i.e., a range of maneuver solutions was provided) for all 
displays except the baseline (D1) condition and decoupling them from the C2 interface. As shown in 
Figure 4, initial edit times had a consistently smaller range in PT5 for both alert types. The range of initial 
edit times for encounters that began as a corrective alert was 6.34s to 9.87, while the range for warning 
alert encounters was even smaller, 4.17s to 6.05s.  
 
  
Figure 4. Mean initial edit times for the predicted collision avoidance alert (iHITL, left) and the corrective 
and warning alerts (PT5, right). 
The initial edit time metric reveals once again how consistent pilot responses were to warning alerts in 
PT5 and suggests that pilots may have been nearing a floor in how quickly they could implement these 
changes given a specific instantiation of a GCS that did not have DAA guidance tightly coupled to the C2 
interfaces. At the same time, the metric underscores the difficulty in comparing overall aircraft response 
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times between iHITL and PT5; while pilots were performing the same task in both studies, albeit with 
different alerting structures, they were equipped with very different DAA tools which had a large effect 
on how quickly they could implement ‘edits’. Taken as a whole, the response time data suggests that the 
DAA warning alert, compared to the iHITL predicted collision avoidance alert, spurred pilots to initiate 
their responses more immediately and complete the edit process as quickly as the control interfaces 
allowed, leading to a more efficient overall completion of the DAA task.  
ATC Coordination 
In order to ensure the interoperability of UAS with the air traffic environment, pilots of UAS will be 
expected to comply with the same operational rules as pilots of manned aircraft. A key area of concern 
with respect to pilots executing the DAA function is whether they will coordinate their traffic avoidance 
maneuvers off of their pre-filed flight plan prior to maneuvering to avoid a loss of well clear. The DAA 
MOPS currently specify that pilots utilizing the DAA system to maintain well clear will coordinate with 
ATC “as time allows”, and if coordination cannot be accomplished, the pilot “is authorized to deviate in 
order to remain well clear and avoid a collision with other aircraft”.  
Figure 5 shows the proportion of maneuvers where pilots obtained an ATC clearance prior to 
maneuvering off of their flight plan by alert type. The results indicate that pilots treated the predicted 
collision avoidance alert and the warning alert similarly; the proportion of maneuvers executed to avoid 
a loss of well clear that received prior ATC approval was 34% and 23%, respectively. In contrast, pilots 
obtained ATC approval prior to maneuvering 65% of the time with the corrective alert.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. The proportion of encounters, by alert structure, where pilots obtained an ATC clearance prior 
to executing a maneuver to avoid a loss of well clear.  
Again, the differences in the proportion of encounters that received prior ATC approval is likely due to 
the temporal information provided by each alert structure. With the PT5 alert structure, pilots knew 
that they had more time available when a corrective alert was present to coordinate a maneuver with 
ATC – if they ran out of time and needed to maneuver immediately, they would receive a warning alert. 
In contrast, the predicted collision avoidance alert within the iHITL alert structure gave no indication of 
how soon a loss of well clear would occur, and therefore, when a maneuver needed to be executed 
immediately (versus allowing more time to contact ATC). This appears to have led pilots to frequently 
prioritize maneuvering first over coordinating with ATC, rather than risk a loss of well clear. Despite this 
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apparent preference, however, pilots utilizing the iHITL alerting structure were not better at maintaining 
well clear compared to those utilizing the PT5 alerting structure. 
Losses of Well Clear 
The proportion of predicted losses of well clear that lead to an actual loss of well clear, for which the 
pilot was deemed at-fault, are shown in Figure 6. Overall, the observed proportion of losses of well clear 
in the iHITL simulation (0.03 – 0.14) are moderately higher than those observed in PT5 (0.00 – 0.09). 
Again, because the display configurations and test set ups cannot be directly compared, it is dif ficult to 
draw conclusions directly from just the proportion of losses of well clear observed in each experiment. 
 
  
Figure 6. The proportion of encounters that were predicted to result in a loss of well clear that did 
actually did result in a loss of well clear, for the iHITL (left) and PT5 (right) alerting structures.  
 
Table 4 provides additional evidence for the improved loss of well clear support provided by the PT5 
alerting structure compared to the iHITL alerting structure.  
Table 4 shows the proportion of losses of well clear by category of loss of well clear for which pilot 
responsibility was attributed. The losses of well clear for iHITL and PT5 were assigned one of three 
categories: ineffective maneuver, too slow, and too early return to course. An ‘ineffective maneuver’ 
occurred when the pilot did not make a sufficient maneuver to avoid the loss of well clear, even though 
they had enough time and the guidance was correct (in the conditions with available maneuver 
guidance). A loss of well clear was categorized as ‘too slow’ when the pilot was alerted to the threat 
with sufficient time to resolve it but did not respond quickly enough to avoid a loss of well clear. A ‘too 
early return’ loss of well clear occurred when the pilot successfully avoided a threat but returned  to 
course before there was ample separation between the two aircraft and triggered a loss of well clear.  
Table 4. The proportion of losses of well clear by category of loss of well clear for which pilot 
responsibility was attributed. 
 
Ineffective 
Maneuver 
Too Slow Too Early Return 
iHITL 0.21 0.79 0.00 
PT5 0.57 0.13 0.30 
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The above results show that in the iHITL, 75% of losses of clear were due to pilots executing maneuvers 
too slowly. This number dropped to 13% in PT5. Therefore, despite fairly short average aircraft response 
times for pilots in iHITL (Figure 2), there were nonetheless multiple instances where they were unsure of 
when an immediate maneuver was necessary and when they had time to engage in less time intensive 
actions (such as trial plan a variety of maneuvers or await for approval from ATC). In fact, as shown in 
Figure 7, pilots in the iHITL experiment were observed coordinating their maneuver with ATC even in 
instances where a loss of well clear was imminent. For alerts that appeared at 15 seconds or less to loss 
of well clear, when pilots should be immediately executing a maneuver, they in fact waited to receive 
approval from ATC 47% of the time. By comparison, pilots in PT5 were much less likely to attempt to 
coordinate their traffic avoidance maneuver at such a close proximity to a loss of well clear; at 15 or 
seconds or less to a loss of well clear, pilots waited to obtain prior ATC approval only 20% of the time. 
  
Figure 7. Proportion of pilot maneuvers per bin (e.g., <15s)  in iHITL (left) and PT5 (right) with and 
without an obtained ATC clearance by time to loss of well clear at first alert.  
Summary 
The above results provide strong evidence for the performance benefits of including the DAA warning 
alert within the DAA alerting structure. The results presented above indicate that the DAA warning alert 
facilitates pilots’ ability to respond quickly enough to avoid an imminent loss of well clear, while also 
supporting their determination of whether there is adequate time to coordinate their traffic avoidance 
maneuver off of their flight plan with ATC.  These performance benefits result in both an increase in ATC 
interoperability — by increasing the frequency that pilots coordinate with ATC prior to maneuvering — 
as well as a reduction in the occurrences of losses of well clear, especially those that result from pilots 
executing  resolution maneuvers too slowly as a result of attempting to obtain an ATC clearance . 
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Empirical Support for Use of the DAA Warning Alert with TCAS 
II Optional Integration 
The following section presents empirical support for the inclusion of the DAA warning alert even when a 
UAS has been equipped with an optional TCAS II system. The addition of a TCAS II system to the DAA 
system will provide an additional layer of safety to prevent midair collisions. The existing TCAS II system 
has its own alerting structure that includes traffic advisories (TAs) and resolution advisories (RAs). With 
the integration of the DAA and TCAS II systems, the SC-228 DAA working group has reached consensus 
that the TCAS II TAs will be replaced by the DAA caution-level alerts [i.e., the corrective DAA alert and 
the preventive DAA alert (Table 1)]. When the DAA warning alert was initially proposed, it was assumed 
that it would be removed and replaced by the RA alert level if a manufacturer decided to implement a 
TCAS II system with the DAA system. However, observations from a preliminary data collection week 
from a NASA HITL indicated that the removal of the DAA warning alert, even when TCAS II was 
integrated, may result in undesirable pilot behaviors and system outcomes.  
Alerting Structures for Cooperative Aircraft when TCAS II is Integrated 
The NASA HITL (“mini-HITL”) initially included an experimental design that was intended to examine the 
performance of pilots on maintaining well clear and traffic avoidance when the DAA warning alert was 
maintained versus being removed from the integrated DAA-TCAS II alerting structure. This change in 
alert structure would only apply to cooperative intruders which could generate an RA; the DAA warning 
alert would be maintained for all other aircraft (e.g., non-cooperative) for which an RA would not be 
generated by the TCAS II system. Table 5 shows the two alerting structures for cooperative aircraft with 
and without the DAA warning alert.  
Table 5. Comparison of the No Warning and With Warning alerting structures evaluated in NASA’s mini-
HITL simulation. 
DAA-TCAS II Integrated Alerting Structures for Cooperative Aircraft 
With Warning Alert No Warning Alert 
Symbol Name 
Aural Alert 
Verbiage 
Symbol Name 
Aural Alert 
Verbiage 
 
TCAS RA 
“Climb/ 
Descend” 
   
 
DAA Warning 
Alert 
“Traffic, 
Maneuver 
Now”  
TCAS RA 
“Climb/ 
Descend” 
 
Corrective DAA 
Alert 
“Traffic, 
Separate”  
Corrective DAA 
Alert 
“Traffic, Avoid” 
 
Preventive 
DAA Alert 
“Traffic, 
Monitor”  
Preventive DAA 
Alert 
“Traffic, Monitor” 
 
None (Target) N/A 
 
None (Target) N/A 
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During the first week of two planned weeks of data collection, pilots were subjectively observed by 
researchers to be slower to respond  when the DAA warning alert was not present, which resulted in a 
higher number of RAs. Although objective data could not be analyzed at the time, the decision was 
made to run the second week of data collection with the DAA warning alert for all intruders. The 
following section details the results of the data analyzed from the first week of data collection and the 
performance differences between the two integrated DAA-TCAS II alerting structures. Since the 
simulation system underwent some changes during the first week of data collection, it was not 
appropriate to conduct statistical analyses on this data. Nevertheless, the changes made were unlikely 
to have had a biased impact on pilot performance with one alert structure compared to the other; 
therefore, the descriptive statistics from this data still provide useful insight into the potential effect of 
removing the DAA warning alert in the integrated DAA-TCAS II alerting structure. 
Pilot Performance Comparison 
Response Times 
As with the data presented for iHITL and PT5, pilot response times in the NASA mini-HITL were 
broken into multiple components. There were, however, several importance differences between 
the previous studies and the mini-HITL that are worth noting. The mini-HITL experimental set up 
utilized a pairwise encounter, or “part task”, design where pilots were exposed to a series of short 
(e.g., less then two minutes) as opposed to the “full mission” design of iHITL and PT5 where pilots 
completed 37-minutes scenarios that included roughly eight encounters. This lower-fidelity set up 
resulted in pilots no longer having to contact ATC over a busy frequency (they merely had to 
‘request’ a maneuver from the researcher, who was seated next to them at the GCS) or keep up with 
secondary tasks. These simulation changes, along with a much larger number of encounters per 
condition, likely led pilots to respond faster and more uniformly across this experiment than the 
previous simulations. Furthermore, the mini-HITL response time data in this paper only reports on 
pilots’ encounters against cooperative aircraft (i.e., those equipped with TCAS-II). Since the alerting 
structure for encounters with non-cooperative aircraft always contained a warning-level alert, they 
were left out of the present findings.  
The mini-HITL experimental set up provided for an increased level of control over the encounter 
geometries presented to the pilot participants. This new ability allowed researchers to divide 
encounters into two distinct groups: those that provided pilots with the maximum look ahead time 
possible, given the alert structure (i.e., 55s to loss of well clear), and those that made a last-second 
acceleration (within roughly 10s of a loss of well clear) in the direction of ownship in order to force 
the triggering of a DAA warning or TCAS II RA. These latter use cases were referred to as “Blunders” 
and were intended to test aspects of the system that may not have been stressed had pilots been 
given sufficient time to resolve all of the scripted conflicts presented to them. The other use case, 
labeled “Non Blunders”, progressed to DAA warning or TCAS II RA alerts only if pilots neglected to 
take action after receiving ample time to respond. Consistent with expectations, 90% of the Non-
Blunder encounters failed to progress to a DAA warning when the alert level was available. For this 
reason, the following response time data reports only on encounters against blundering aircraft. 
Figure 8 shows pilots’ aircraft response times in mini-HITL as a function of the alert structure 
available to pilots (i.e., with a DAA warning or without a DAA warning alert). Pilots were found to 
respond slower overall when they did not have the warning alert (11.56s) compared to when the 
warning alert was available (7.02s). Figure 9 shows that the reductions in aircraft response times 
for the DAA warning condition were the result of reductions in both initial response times and 
initial edit times for pilots that had an alert structure with a DAA warning. Initial response times to 
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a blunder encounter were roughly 3s faster when there was a warning alert, while initial edit times 
were roughly 2s faster than when there wasn’t a warning alert. Also of note in these results is the 
presence of less variability within the DAA warning condition. Pilots were far more uniform in each 
stage of their response to a blunder when a DAA warning was present compared to when it was 
absent (as evidenced by the shorter standard error bars). 
 
Figure 8. Mean aircraft response times against cooperative intruders that ‘blundered’ into ownship, by 
mini-HITL alert structure. 
 
  
Figure 9. Mean initial response times (left) and initial edit times (right) against cooperative intruders 
that ‘blundered’ into ownship, by mini-HITL alert structure. 
Proportion of Losses of Well Clear & Occurrence of RAs 
The presence of a DAA warning alert was not found to have any impact on the proportion of 
predicted to actual losses of well clear or the frequency of TCAS II corrective RAs (i.e., those 
requiring a maneuver response by the pilot to avoid an imminent collision) in the NASA mini-HITL. 
This is likely more a function of the experimental design of the study rather than a reflection of the 
utility of inclusion of the DAA warning alert within the integrated DAA-TCAS II alerting structure. 
Since the experiment was divided into blunder and non-blunder encounters, pilots were either 
intentionally provided with insufficient time to resolve a conflict, as in the blunder encounters 
(where pilots had, at most 10s to a loss of well clear), or were given the maximum time possible 
under the alerting thresholds, as in the non-blunder cases (where pilots had the full 55s until a loss 
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of well clear). The loss of well clear and RA metrics bear this out: across all blunder encounters, 
pilots lost well clear 99% of the time and received a corrective RA 100% of the time (there were 
three instances of pilots receiving a corrective RA while they were well clear due to the specific 
encounter geometry). On the flip side, pilots never experienced a loss of well clear or corrective RA 
in any of the non-blunder encounters. 
While the total absence of losses of well clear and RAs in cases where pilots had a maximum look 
ahead time for an encounter is indeed a positive finding, one should be cautioned against inferring 
too much from this result. As has been said, pilots had the benefit of a full alert progression. Just as 
critically, however, pilots were also less encumbered by secondary tasks throughout the mini-HITL 
experiment. There was no confederate ATC to communicate with over a busy frequency, nor a 
variety of other secondary tasks that had accompanied pilots in iHITL and PT5 (such as responding 
to chat messages and simulated system failures) that can take pilots’ attention away from the task 
of remaining well clear. In general, this means that pilots responded more quickly and 
appropriately than would be expected in real world operations. In addition to this, the experimental 
design did not explicitly test the essential purpose of a DAA warning alert, which is to indicate to 
pilots that there was no longer any time to interact with ATC or extensively evaluate different 
evasive maneuvers. Had the experiment been designed with this in mind, there would have been 
more than just 2 encounter types (blunder/non-blunder); for instance, an encounter that alerted 
closer to the onset of a DAA warning – but not so close to an actual loss of well clear, such as 35s 
prior - could have tested the utility of a DAA warning in cases where the encounter was on the 
border of a corrective and warning alert. As it was designed, the mini-HITL experiment largely 
eliminated the ability of a DAA warning to impact the occurrence of a loss of well clear or RA. 
While the proportion of losses of well clear or corrective RA metrics are not well suited to assessing 
pilot performance as a function of the DAA warning in the NASA mini-HITL, there are multiple well 
clear severity metrics that help shed light on the extent of the penetration of the well clear 
threshold in instances where well clear could not be maintained. Figure 10 shows the average 
duration of losses of well clear by mini-HITL alert structure. On average, losses of well clear that 
occurred without a DAA warning present lasted roughly 3 seconds longer compared to when the 
alert was not available. 
In addition to slightly shorter loss of well clear durations, Figure 11 indicates that two measures of 
the severity of losses of well clear show better performance in the With DAA warning alert 
structure. The separation index, Sindex, (Equation 1) is defined as the larger of the horizontal and 
vertical separations normalized by the required separation in each dimension where the h_sepCA 
and v_sepCA are the geometric portions of the well clear definition. When losses of well clear did 
occur, the separation index was slightly higher for the With Warning alert structure compared to 
the No Warning alert structure (58% vs 53% of the well clear spatial threshold was maintained), 
meaning that greater separation was preserved (or conversely, less penetration of the well clear 
threshold). The minimum separation severity metric is a measure of the minimum slant range 
distance between ownship and another aircraft. As seen in Figure 11, the With Warning alert 
structure had greater separation distances in cases where well clear was lost, on average, compared 
to the Without Warning alert structure (0.65 nm vs. 0.50 nm). 
16 
 
 
Figure 10. Mean duration of losses of well clear by mini-HITL alert structure. 
 
 
Figure 11. Two measures of the severity of losses of well clear for all encounters by mini-HITL alert 
structure: separation index (left) and minimum separation (right). 
 
Equation 1. Separation Index 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡 {𝑚𝑎𝑥 [
ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑧. 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒(𝑡𝑖)
ℎ_𝑠𝑒𝑝𝐶𝐴
,
𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡. 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒(𝑡𝑖)
𝑣_𝑠𝑒𝑝𝐶𝐴
]}   
Summary 
The results from the first week of data collection of NASA’s mini-HITL provides converging 
evidence for the inclusion of the DAA warning alert even when a UAS is optionally equipped with 
TCAS II in addition to the DAA system. When looking at pilots’ response times to blundering 
encounters with the two different alerting structures, pilots were found to respond more quickly 
overall, and with greater consistency across pilots, when the DAA warning alert was present. While 
the occurrence of losses of well clear and RAs did not differ between alerting structures, pilots 
presented with the DAA warning alert were able to reduce the duration and severity of the violation 
compared to pilots without the alert. While the separation data reveals only moderate benefits for 
the DAA warning alert, it is likely that this is a greater reflection of the experimental design than it 
is of the two different alerting structures. Although the differences across all metrics were likely not 
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large enough to result in statistical significance, in the absence of any other data comparing the 
integrated DAA-TCAS II alerting structure with and without the DAA warning alert, it provides 
moderate empirical evidence that inclusion of this alert in the integrated alerting structure 
provides desirable performance benefits. 
Conclusion 
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